Criminal Law and Procedure by Wynn, Robert L., III
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 19 
Issue 4 Survey of South Carolina Law 1967 Article 5 
1967 
Criminal Law and Procedure 
Robert L. Wynn III 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Wynn, Robert L. III (1967) "Criminal Law and Procedure," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 19 : Iss. 4 , 
Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
There were no dramatic changes in the criminal law and pro-
cedure area during the last survey period as a result of South
Carolina Supreme Court decisions. The United States Supreme
Court, however, had a banner year and "legislated" more pro-
cedural rules for the states in order to safeguard the constitu-
tional rights of an accused individual. The Court, in landmark
cases decided that: coercion will be found where an arresting
officer, advising an accused of his constitutional rights, at the
same time warns the accused of a penalty for not talking;1 the
sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is applicable in state
cases through the fourteenth amendment;2 sex offenders may
not be given what amounts to an indeterminate sentence under
the guise of treatment in a proceeding where constitutional
rights are not afforded ;8 juvenile delinquency proceedings which
may lead to incarceration must follow procedural due process;4
counsel must be present at post-indictment lineups,5 but need not
be present when an accused is asked to give a sample of his
handwriting.6
The Court, in other cases, held that the recidivist statutes are
constitutional, 7 but that anti-miscegenation laws are in violation
of equal protection and due process.8
I. CRDmEAL PROCEDUIM
A. Right to CounseZ
In Myers v. State9 the court discussed at length the adequacy
of counsel issue. The defendant and a co-defendant had been
convicted of violating the safecracking statute and sentenced to
life imprisonment. The case reached the supreme court after
denial of a writ of habeas corpus. Conceding on appeal that
counsel at the lower court trial was representing both defendants,
1. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) ; Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967).
2. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 87 S. Ct. 988 (1967).
3. Sprecht v. Patterson, 385 U.S. 968 (1967).
4. lis re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967).
5. United States v. Wade, 87 S. Ct 1926 (1967).
6. Gilbert v. California, 87 S. Ct. 1951 (1967).
7. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
8. Loving v. Virginia, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967). See Comment, 19 S.C.L. Rsv.
253 (1967).
9. 248 S.C. 539, 151 S.E2d 665 (1966).
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the appellant argued that such representation amounted to in-
adequate representation in violation of his constitutional rights.
The defendant alleged that there was a conflict of interests
between the two defendants, that compulsory process was not
used by counsel to obtain defense witnesses, and that counsel
neglected to let the defendant testify at the trial in his own
behalf. The court found none of the charges meritorious and
pointed out that, though mere perfunctory representation does
not satisfy the rights of the accused,10
the quality of the service rendered by counsel meets all
requirements of due process when counsel is a member in
good standing of the Bar, gives his client his complete
loyalty, serves him in good faith to the best of his ability,
and, his service is of such character as to preserve the essen-
tial integrity of the proceedings as a trial in a court of jus-
tice. He is not required to be infallible, nor to do the impos-
sible, since the defendant is entitled to a fair trial and not
a perfect one or a perfect result.1
Adequacy of counsel was again the issue before the court in
MCrary v. State.12 There the court found the defendant ade-
quately represented by counsel even though: counsel did not seek
a directed verdict of acquittal at the end of state's evidence;
counsel agreed to consolidate two indictments for related offenses
into one trial; and counsel elected not to present any evidence
for the defense but to rely solely on argument. The court found
that the defendant had been represented by an experienced trial
lawyer who performed in good faith to the end that the accused
would receive a fair trial.
B. Arrest and Searh and Seizure
I In State v. Thomas,'8 an appeal from a conviction for rape,
the court reaffirmed the principle that an arrest may be made
without a warrant provided the arresting officer has reason to
believe a felony has been committed and that the person arrested
10. Turner v. Maryland, 303 F2d 507 (4th Cir. 1962).
11. Myers v. State, 248 S.C. 539, 542, 151 S.E2d 665, 666 (1966), quoting
from Tillman v. State, 244 S.C. 259, 264, 136 S.E.2d 300, 303 (1964).
12. 249 S.C. 14, 152 S.E2d 235 (1967).
13. 248 S.C. 573, 151 S.E.2d 855 (1966).
1967]
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committed it." A legal search may follow if incident to the
arrest.
State v. Swilling'5 reached a like result on similar facts. In
addition, the court there found that the failure to take defendant
before a magistrate after his arrest without a warrant for eleven
days would not require reversal unless such action deprived the
defendant of a fair trial. The defendant's charges that the police
misconduct deprived him of his right to bail and thus to prepare
an adequate defense were held groundless since release under
bail is not a matter of right and since the record showed that
he had easy access to the names of witnesses to his crime.
0. Solicitor and Judge
In State v. Parker0 the court held that the decision of the
circuit court concerning the credibility and weight of newly dis-
covered evidence offered on a motion for a new trial would not
be disturbed unless there was a showing of abuse of discretion
or error of law.
The defendants in State v. Well' 17 were convicted of con-
spiracy to commit abortion and appealed for a new trial on the
ground of new evidence. Again the court noted the discretion of
the trial court in such matters and held that a movant for a new
trial based on after-acquired evidence would have to show that
such evidence
(1) is such as would probably change the result if a new
trial is had; (2) has been discovered since the trial; (3)
could not by the exercise of due diligence have been discov-
ered before the trial; (4) is material to the issue; and (5) is
not merely cumulative or impeaching.'3
No abuse of discretion or error of law was found in the lower
court's denial of the motion.19
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-251 (1962). From the undisputed trial court record
it was found that the assailant's identity was known to the prosecutrix and
that this information was communicated to her rescuer who told the arresting
police.
15. No. 18664 (S.C., June 8, 1967).
16. 153 S.E2d 183 (S.C. 1967).
17. 153 S.E.2d 904 (S.C. 1967). The evidence consisted of an affidavit to the
effect that the defendant gave the victim of the abortion her money back after
he discovered she wanted an abortion, and that the victim was trying to get
even with the defendant.
18. Id. at 911.
19. The court found that the evidence probably would not have changed the
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In State va. Squires20 the defendants were indicted for bur-
glary, armed robbery, housebreaking and larceny. They pleaded
guilty to burglary and were convicted, but the trial court was
reversed and ordered to grant a new trial after a successful peti-
tion of habeas corpus charged that the petitioners had been with-
out the benefit of counsel when their pleas of guilty were
entered. The second trial found the defendants guilty, from
which verdict the defendants appealed.
In the course of the second trial one of the defendants tried
to explain that the solicitor had threatened him with life im-
prisonment if he did not plead guilty at the first trial. The
solicitor, in argument to the jury, responded, "If you believe I
told them that, I hope you will turn them loose."2 1 The defend-
ants, on appeal, asserted that the objection made to strike the
statement should not have been refused since it allowed the
solicitor, who was not a witness, to challenge the veracity of the
defendant. The supreme court felt that the trial judge must be
left alone to conclude whether such situations are prejudicial,
since he is there and is in a better position to observe "the context
in which the language is used, the manner, tone of voice, and
bearing of counsel."2 2 Finding no abuse of this wide discretion
left to the trial judge, the court rejected the argument of preju-
dice.
In State . Leiderma 23 another party had raped the prose-
cutrix in a cabin owned by the defendant and located near his
place of business. Leiderman denied touching the prosecutrix
and any participation in the crime, and an important issue was
whether he was, in the eyes of the law, aiding and abetting. The
court found prejudicial error in the trial judge's failure to reply
to the jury's request for further instructions regarding the legal
principles of accessoral responsibility.
The question of whether a trial judge has a duty to question
one accused of murder to determine if he understands the conse-
quences of his guilty plea before the court receives such was
answered in the negative, at least where it is evident to the court
that he has already been appraised of this fact. The record in
Thompson v. State24 indicated that at the trial the defendant's
20. 248 S.C. 239, 149 S.E2d 601 (1966).
21. Id. at 246, 149 S.E2d at 604.
22. Id.
23. 249 S.C. 61, 152 S.E.2d 354 (1967).
24. 248 S.C. 475, 151 S.E2d 221 (1966).
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retained counsel had entered into negotiations with the solicitor
since a case against Thompson was apparently fairly well estab-
lished. The defendant was counseled about the situation and
upon this advice entered a plea of guilty of murder with recom-
mendation for mercy. He was present in court when the judge
accepted his plea, when the jury foreman was asked to sign a
consent verdict as pleaded for, and when the judge pronounced
the mandatory life sentence. He made no objection. The court
held that the accused was sufficiently aware of the consequences
of his guilty plea and that the trial judge's failure to admonish
the accused as to such consequences was not prejudicial error nor
was it a denial of due process.25
Another contention of the appellant was that his guilty plea
was not voluntary since it was a result of his counsel's advice
that if he did not so plead he would get the electric chair. The
court pointed out that it was the duty of legal counsel in capital
cases to apprise their clients of the possibility of a death sen-
tence, and that such suggestions do not constitute coercion such
as to make a guilty plea to a lesser offense not voluntary. The
court seemingly disregarded the difference between the sugges-
tions that the defendant "wou&d get the chair" and "couZd get
the chair."
In State v. Canno 26 the defendant's conviction for rape was
overturned by the South Carolina Supreme Court and remanded
because the lower court erred in its failure to determine whether
a confession was voluntary before submitting the question to
the jury. At the trial a search warrant used by officers in the
search of appellant's home was ruled invalid, and articles taken
were excluded from evidence in accordance with Mapp.27 But
the trial court record and other evidence showed conflict as to
whether or not articles taken from the defendant's home by
virtue of the invalid warrant were used to elicit an illegal con-
fession. The court noted that if the evidence had been so used,
the confession would have to be excluded also as a fruit of the
illegality.28 Since it was apparent from the record that the trial
judge had not made any reliable initial determination on the
25. This is the minority approach, and it is mildly rebuked in Comment, 19
S.C.L. ZEv. 261 (1967). The federal view is also to the contrary. FED. R.
Cnnm. P. 11. See Note, 18 S.C.L. REv. 668 (1966).
26. 248 S.C. 506, 151 S.E.2d 752 (1966).
27. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
28. See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 363 U.S. 643 (1961).
[Vol. 19
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issue of voluntariness before submitting the confession to the
jury, the supreme court held that a determination on this issue
would have to be made by the lower court. The court followed
the Jackson v. Denno29 decision, which held that a tribunal other
than the jury, charged with deciding innocence or guilt, must
make the initial determination of the voluntariness of a confes-
sion. The court did not order a new trial because in its opinion
neither the Constitution nor Jackson required one if, in a col-
lateral proceeding, the appellant's confession was determined to
be voluntary.
A federal court in Moorer v. South Carolin&80 ordered a new
trial where the lower court had failed to give the jury or itself
an opportunity to determine the voluntariness of a confession
made after arrest and alluded to at the trial even though the
contents were not disclosed.
A statement by the trial judge that defense counsel "better let
him [the defendant] go on the stand" was held to have been a
mere suggestion rather than a command that the defendants
testify against themselves in State v. Johnson.31
The defendants in State V. Squires82 utilized the Escobedo83
rationale and charged that the trial court committed reversible
error in admitting into evidence a confession rendered while
defendants were without the benefit of counsel. The court felt
the exception without merit since Squires preceded 4 Escobedo,
and Johnso 88 had restricted Escobedo to a prospective appli-
cation.
D. Indictments
In the companion cases of Dukes v. State 8  and Owen v.
State37 the appellants pleaded guilty to an indictment captioned
"Indictment for Highway Robbery and Larceny," which offense
carries a maximum sentence of ten years.38 The trial court had
29. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
30. 368 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1966).
31. 249 S.C. 1, 152 S.E2d 669 (1967).
32. 248 S.C. 239, 149 S.E2d 601 (1966).
33. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
34. The confessions were made in 1959 and admitted into evidence at a 1963
trial. Escobedo was not handed down until 1964.
35. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
36. 248 S.C. 227, 149 S.E2d 598 (1966).
37. 248 S.C. 233, 149 S.E2d 600 (1966).
38. S.C. CoD ANN. § 17-552 (1962).
1967]
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sentenced the defendants to twenty-five years of hard labor.
Upon a remand and resentencing order the lower court was
requested to construe the indictment and resentence accordingly.
The lower court viewed the plain words of the indictment as
charging the defendants with armed robbery (which carries a
maximum sentence of twenty-five years)39 rather than highway
robbery and reinstated the twenty-five year sentence. On appeal
this decision was affirmed. The court regarded the caption as
mere surplusage, pointing out that the indictment plainly stated
on its face that it charged "robbery while armed with a pistol."
Furthermore, any objection to such surplusage, defect, or am-
biguity surrounding the indictment was waived by the failure
to question it by way of demurrer or motion to quash as the
statutes demand.
40
In Crady v. State41 the defendant pleaded guilty to an indict-
ment containing on its face five counts, the fourth of which was
for safecracking. Upon his plea of guilty, the court sentenced
the defendant to fourteen years on count four coupled with con-
current one year sentences on the other four counts. The peti-
tioner, on appeal, contended that since the caption on the back
of the indictment listed possession of burglary tools as the fourth
count, and a fourteen year sentence exceeded the maximum pun-
ishment permissible by statute for this offense, the defendant
should be freed. The lower court rejected defendant's habeas
corpus petition and the supreme court dismissed his appeal. The
court cited Dukes and Owens in holding that "the plain language
of an indictment is not to be ignored merely because its caption
does not precisely conform with the wording on its face.142
State v. Squires48 held it was not improper for the trial judge
in a new trial to allow a copy of the original indictment to go
to the jury where every effort was made by the judge to avoid
any possible prejudice to the defendants who had pleaded guilty
to one of the charges in the four-count indictment.44 The de-
fendants, the court said, were not entitled to re-indictment.
In State v. Sheppard45 the defendant was indicted for driving
"while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and drugs" in
39. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-145, 16-333 (1962).
40. S.C. CODE AN. § 17-409 (1962).
41. 248 S.C. 522, 151 S.E.2d 670 (1966).
42. Id. at 525, 151 S.E.2d at 671.
43. 248 S.C. 239, 149 S.E.2d 601 (1966).
44. The jury was instructed to disregard the pleas of the defendants entered
on the original indictment.
45. 248 S.C. 464, 150 S.E.2d 916 (1966).
[Vol. 19
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violation of a state statute.40  The circuit court quashed the
indictment since it charged two separate offenses in the same
count, i.e., (1) driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor
and (2) driving under the influence of drugs. The supreme
court reversed and remanded for trial observing that the pro-
scribed conduct under the statute was the operation of a motor
vehicle by one who is under the influence of liquor or drugs. An
indictment charging an accused in conjunctive terms with more
than one offense, the court explained, is not duplicitous.
In Allen v. MacDougall47 an indictment which charged the
defendant and another with housebreaking, larceny, and safe-
cracking was held not defective though the defendant's name
did not appear on it when drawn, since testimony had revealed
that his name was added before it was submitted to the grand
jury.
McOrary v. State48 held that timely objection and a showing
of prejudice are necessary for a successful motion for a separa-
tion of a consolidated indictment.
E. Habeas Corpus
Carroll v. MaoDougall49 involved an appeal from an order of
the circuit court dismissing a writ of habeas corpus. There an
illiterate twenty-five-year-old laborer alleged that he believed
he was entering a plea of guilty to manslaughter rather than a
plea of guilty to murder with recommendation of mercy. The
supreme court held that since the unchallenged transcript of the
proceedings refuted the claims of the petitioner, the former
court's action denying the writ must be affirmed.
In Tucker v. State"o the supreme court overturned a lower
court's order that granted a habeas corpus petition on grounds
that the defendant was denied legal counsel. The court found
that the unimpeached original trial journal of the case showed
petitioner was represented by capable counsel, and held that
uncorroborated statements which related to a trial held thirty
years before were legally insufficient evidence to bear the burden
of proof.5 1
46. S.C. CODE AN. § 46-343 (1962).
47. 248 S.C. 588, 151 S.E2d 863 (1966).
48. 249 S.C. 14, 152 S.E.2d 235 (1967).
49. 248 S.C. 141, 149 S.E.2d 343 (1966). In the context of its opinion the
court quotes a part of the trial record which demonstrates the manner in which
a trial judge may be certain that a defendant fully understands his guilty plea.
50. 248 S.C. 344, 149 S.E.2d 769 (1966).
51. "It is well settled that the burden is upon petitioner in habeas corpus to
sustain the allegations of his petition by the greater weight or preponderance
of the evidence." Id. at 346, 149 S.E.2d at 771.
1967]
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In oCray v. State5 2 a habeas corpus petitioner charged that
the trial court's record was insufficient and incorrect and filed
an eleven-page document purporting to be an accurate record of
the missing proceedings, testimony, objections and statements.
The supreme court accepted the court reporter's transcript rather
than the petitioner's uncorroborated account of activities of his
trial not set on paper until three years later.
MACreight v. MacDougaZI5 3 held that habeas corpus would
not lie to test the constitutionality of evidence54 admitted at the
lower court without objection. The defendant was held to have
waived objection to any defects in the evidence by his failure
to object to its admissibility in the lower court.
In another waiver case, State v. Murray,55 the supreme court
cited the Mcr'eight case and refused to grant the appellant a
new trial where he had failed to object at the prior trial to cer-
tain prejudicial testimony58 which allegedly deprived him of a
fair trial.
57
Allen v. MaDougal58 found no error where the judge hearing
a habeas corpus petition denied a request made during the hear-
ing for a transcript of trial testimony. The court noted that the
petition had not asked for the transcript, nor was there anything
in the record to indicate it would have been necessary or perti-
nent, and finally, petitioner elected to have the hearing proceed
without it, thereby waiving any right he might have had to
require the transcript furnished.
In Blandsaw v. State5" a habeas corpus petitioner, demanding
immediate release, appealed from a denial of the writ, charging
that he was denied a preliminary hearing, that he was tried
52. 249 S.C. 14, 152 S.E.2d 235 (1967).
53. 248 S.C. 222, 149 S.E2d 621 (1966).
54. The objectionable evidence consisted of an admission made by the de-
fendant to the arresting officers while he was allegedly illegally detained with-
out a warrant or probable cause and without being advised of his constitutional
right to counsel or to remain silent, and the murder weapon which was al-
legedly obtained after police had illegally searched the defendant's car without
a search warrant.
55. 248 S.C. 473, 150 S.E.2d 920 (1966).
56. The testimony alluded to consisted of references to a prior confinement
in jail when the defendant's character had not been put in issue and statements
made by the defendant to police officers shortly after his arrest which were ad-
mitted into evidence without a prior determination of their voluntariness.
57. For a discussion of recent federal cases which try to avoid the harshness
of state waiver rules see Criminal Law and Procedure, 19 S.C.L. Rv. 30, 4041
(1967).
58. 248 S.C. 588, 151 S.E.2d 863 (1966).
59. 249 S.C. 42, 152 S.E2d 349 (1967).
[Vol. 19
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under the wrong name, that the solicitor's conduct of the trial
was deliberately prejudicial toward him, that the lower court
failed to allow his witnesses to testify, and that he was not ade-
quately represented by counsel. The court held that even assum-
ing the truth of the allegations, the appellant would have been
entitled only to a new trial and not absolute release as he
requested.60
In Wines v. State61 the novel question was raised as to whether
under existing South Carolina law the State Hospital has
authority to confine and treat an ex-convict in the State Peni-
tentiary. The petitioner had completed serving sentence at the
penitentiary in May, 1964, and he immediately became a volun-
tary patient at the State Hospital. After a twenty-one day stay
at the hospital, Wines was transferred back to the penitentiary,
having been classified as "insane and dangerous." A habeas
corpus petition was instituted and rejected. On appeal, the court
sidestepped the issue and remanded the cause, without prejudice,
for the lower court to determine whether habeas corpus would
lie in view of the fact that immediate release was not demanded
and also to determine if Wines needed a guardian ad litem.
F. Motions for Change of Venue and Continuance
In State v. Squires62 the supreme court reaffirmed the general
xule that a motion for continuance may be denied at the discre-
tion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal
without a clear showing of abuse of such discretion. The court
held that a denial of a motion for a continuance was not an
abuse of discretion where the case was over four years old, the
only living witness who could identify the defendants was
seventy-four years old, there was no showing that any other
evidence would be forthcoming or that any other points would
be raised if the motion were granted, and counsel did not renew
and vigorously argue for such motion when the trial commenced
four days later.
In State v. Canno763 the defendant, charged with rape, moved
for a continuance so that he might obtain a psychiatric examina-
tion from a psychiatrist of his own choosing who resided 200
60. Grant v. MacDougall, 244 S.C. 387, 137 S.E2d 270 (1964) settled this
point.
61. 153 S.E2d 392 (S.C. 1967).
62. 248 S.C. 239, 149 S.E2d 601 (1966).
63. 248 S.C. 506, 151 S.E2d 752 (1966).
1967]
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miles away. The appellant had been examined by the South
Carolina State Hospital and found to be sane. The court found,
after an examination of the record, that there was no showing
that any favorable evidence would have been adduced by allow-
ing the continuance and so held to the rule adhered to in Squires.
In the same case, error was charged in that the trial court refused
to grant a change of venue. The motion was predicated on the
contention that a fair and impartial trial could not be had due
to prejudicial pre-trial publicity. The court found no basis for
this charge and held that the trial judge has the same wide dis-
cretion to grant a change of venue motion as he does for con-
tinuance motions.
The defendant in State v. Swilling64 alleged that his second
trial for murder was not fair or impartial since pre-trial pub-
licity reported that he had been previously tried, convicted and
sentenced to death; and, hence, his motion for change of venue
or continuance was erroneously refused. The court rejected the
argument, pointing out that there was no showing that any of
the jurors had read or heard the allegedly prejudicial publicity;
that there was no showing of any prejudicial implications in its
content; and that the trial court, in its discretion, had accepted
each juror as impartial and fair.65
The court noted in State v. Wells66 that a conspiracy to com-
mit abortion may be prosecuted in the county where the agree-
ment was made, or in any county where a conspirator did any
overt act in furtherance of the common design.
G. Disqualification of Jurors
The defendants had been indicted, charged, and acquitted of
(1) rape; (2) assault with intent to ravish; (3) assault and
battery of a high and aggravated nature; and (4) conspiracy.
In State V. Johnson(7 the state moved for a new trial" on the
64. No. 18664 (S.C., June 8, 1967).
65. But see, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), in which the Su-
preme Court of the United States noted that actual prejudice may not actually
need to be proved.
66. 153 S.E2d 904 (S.C. 1967).
67. 248 S.C. 153, 149 S.E2d 348 (1966).
68. Actually the state had moved for a mistrial. The supreme court found
this to be procedurally inaccurate because "mistrial" applies to a case in which
a jury is discharged without a verdict because of some error or irregularity
which would prevent a proper judgment from being rendered. Here a verdict
of acquittal had been returned and the jury had been discharged before the
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grounds that two members of the jury had been unduly influ-
enced. The motion was denied and the state appealed. 9 The
supreme court cited Spencer v. Kirby ° and stated that in order
to maintain its case for a new trial based on the disqualification
of a juror the state had to show:
(1) the fact of disqualification; (2) that such disqualifica-
tion was unknown before the verdict; and (3) that movant
was not negligent in failing to make discovery of the dis-
qualification before verdict, and was not guilty of a lack of
due diligence in discovering any disqualification.7'1
The supreme court noted that on voir dire examination it was
revealed that certain jurors had been communicated with con-
cerning their services as prospective jurors, and hence by the
exercise of due diligence72 the state should have pursued the
matter at that time. Failing to do so amounted to a waiver by
the state of any objections to the jurors. The court reaffirmed
the rule that the question of the impartiality of a juror is one
addressed to the sole discretion of the trial judge.73 On voir dire
the trial judge asked both jurors if they would be able to render
respondents and the state an impartial and fair trial free of bias
despite the fact that they had been communicated with. The
jurors said they could and the trial judge found the jurors com-
petent and qualified. The supreme court found that there was
no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial judge's action.
H. Double Jeopardy
Double jeopardy was used as a defense in the appeal of State
V. Sguires74 There the defendants, charged with burglary,
armed robbery, housebreaking and larceny, pleaded guilty to
burglary, and were sentenced to a term of twenty-one years in
69. Although the state ordinarily has no right to appeal from a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case, it may do so when the issue is whether a verdict
of acquittal was procured by fraud and collusion. This is so because in actuality
the first trial puts the defendant in no jeopardy and so would not be a bar to a
second trial for the same offense. See State v. Howell, 220 S.C. 178, 66 S.E.2d
701 (1951).
70. 234 S.C. 59, 106 S.E2d 883 (1959).
71. State v. Johnson, 248 S.C. 153, 162, 149 S.E2d 348, 352 (1966).
72. S.C. CODE- ANN. § 38-203 (1962). It is provided by this section and the
cases construing it that all objections to jurors must be made before they are
impaneled if the party could have, using due diligence, found any objection, and
when not made prior thereto such objections are deemed waived thereafter.
73. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-202 (1962).
74. 248 S.C. 239, 149 S.E2d 601 (1966).
1967]
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the State Penitentiary. Thereafter the appellants won a new trial
on the grounds that they did not have the benefit of counsel when
their guilty please were entered. Upon the new trial, the defend-
ants were tried on all four counts of the original indictment,
pleaded not guilty, were found guilty on all four counts by the
jury, and consequently were given a harsher sentence. From this
trial the defendants appealed contending they were placed in
double jeopardy because they did not request or want a new trial
and that the harsher sentences could not be imposed on retrial
for the same crimes as were charged in the original trial.
The court found that a new trial was all that defendants were
entitled to and that they had not declined this relief. The
supreme court disposed of the double jeopardy argument by
pointing out that the general rule is that a defendant waives the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy when he seeks
to set aside a verdict or judgment either on motion in the lower
court or on appeal and a new trial is granted. By the same
reasoning, when the new trial is ordered and begun it is the
same as if no prior trial had ever been had. Therefore, it is
constitutionally permissible to retry and convict a defendant of
counts, "which he was not convicted of on the first trial, includ-
ing a higher degree of crime than that of his first conviction,
in which latter instance the defendant would, of necessity, be
subject to a harsher sentence upon the new trial."75  But the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Patton v. North Carolina7 6
held that increasing a defendant's sentence on retrial, after a
reversal of a conviction on constitutional grounds, denied him
equal protection, violated the principles of double jeopardy, and
had a chilling effect on the exercise of his right to a fair trial.
I. sisoelaneous
In yet another round in the case of foorer v. South Oarolina&7
a federal court ordered the district court to release 355 schedules
detailing the circumstances of rape cases in South Carolina from
1945-1965 to the attorneys for Moorer since they constituted the
work-product of counsel for the defendant, the information con-
tained therein might prove useful in the instant or other litiga-
75. Id. at 249, 149 S.E.2d at 605 (1966).
76. No. 11,005 (4th Cir. June 14, 1967).
77. 368 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1966). See Moorer v. State, 347 F.2d 502 (4th
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tion on the issue of the effect of race on capital sentencing, and
since there appeared to be no reason to withhold them.
A sentence of three months in the county jail was held not to
be cruel and unusual punishment for a conviction of criminal
contempt for jury tampering in State v. JohnSon.
7 8
Allen v. MacDougaZl7 9 reaffirmed this state's position that a
denial of a preliminary hearing to an accused who had been
- indicted by a grand jury, did not amount to a denial of due
process, at least where the defendant was adequately represented
by counsel who did not request it.80
The court in State v. Mor-is,sl noting a division of legal
authority on the question, followed the majority view and held
that where a fine imposed on a criminal accused is voluntarily




In State v. Wel~ls "2 a pregnant female went to the defendant,
Wells, for an abortion. Wells had been recommended by Ellisor.
After attempts by Wells and his nurses to induce a miscarriage
had failed, Wells told the girl to see Ellisor about a Mr. Jones.
Jones performed an operation which resulted in the girl's need-
ing immediate medical attention. Wells and Jones lived in dif-
ferent counties, but the evidence showed they knew each other.
From their convictions for conspiracy to commit abortion, the
defendants appealed alleging that their directed verdicts based
on insufficiency in the evidence should have been granted. The
defendants relied on the "Wharton" or "concert of action" rule 3
which states
Where co-operation or concert between two or more persons
is essential to the commission of a substantive crime and
there is no ingredient of an alleged conspiracy that is not
present in the substantive crime, it is held that the persons
necessarily involved cannot be charged with conspiracy to
78. 249 S.C. 1, 152 S.E2d 669 (1967).
79. 248 S.C. 588, 151 S.E2d 863 (1966).
80. See State v. White, 243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E2d 320 (1963).
81. No. 18668 (S.C., June 13, 1967).
82. 153 S.E2d 904 (S.C. 1967).
83. The court noted that the defense was a novel one and had never been
considered or applied in South Carolina.
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commit the substantive offense and also with the substantive
crime itself.
84
The court sidestepped the issue of whether the "Wharton" rule
was applicable in South Carolina or whether a woman may con-
spire with others to procure an abortion on herself, and held
flatly that under its construction of the abortion laws85 the
substantive offense of the conspiracy could be committed by one
person and therefore the "Wharton" rule was inapplicable. The
record showed that Ellisor and Wells' nurses actively partici-
pated in the conspiracy with Wells, and that after it was estab-
lished Jones joined in and furthered the common design by
actually accomplishing the object of the conspiracy. Conse-
quently, the court found no insufficiency in the evidence.
B. Contempt
In State v. Johnson8  the father and the uncle of one of three
defendants in a rape prosecution were ordered by rule of the
judge who presided over the trial to show cause why they should
not be held in contempt for contacting and attempting to influ-
ence two members of the jury panel.8 7 The defense raised was
that the contact alluded to was made with the juror's wife and
not the juror and that the defendant's wife and not the defend-
ant actually discussed the case with the juror's wife. On appeal
the court noted that participation in the offense was obvious
since the defendant's presence at the discussion had been proved
by the state. The supreme court pointed out that despite the
failure of design, one is guilty of contempt when one intends to
corrupt the administration of justice and commits an overt act
in furtherance of this design.8 The fact that the jurors tam-
pered with did not sit in the trial of the case was held to be
immaterial.
It was held that if, as here, a return to the charges in the rule
for contempt admits the charges, it is as if a guilty plea had
84. 16 Amr. JuRL 2d CotsPiracy § 16 (1964).
85. S.C. CoDE AxN. § 16-82 (1962).
86. 249 S.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 669 (1967).
87. In this case constructive contempt was charged; that is, the alleged con-
temptuous conduct did not occur in the courtroom itself. Such proceedings may
be properly begun by a rule to show cause based upon the petition of the solici-
tor coupled with an affidavit or petition stating the facts upon which the
charges lie. See Hornsby v. Hornsby, 187 S.C. 463, 198 S.E. 29 (1938); State
v. Blackwell, 10 S.C. 35 (1875).
88. State v. Weinberg, 229 S.C. 286, 92 S.E2d 842 (1956).
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been rendered, and although contempt proceedings are criminal
in nature and require that the state bear the burden of proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, charges admitted to be true
are deemed true and need no farther proof. The test of intent in
such cases is subjective intent, and therefore inferences of guilt
could be properly drawn from the admittedly truthful charges
and affidavits. Finally, in the court's opinion the defendants
had not been denied their constitutional right of confrontation
of witnesses against them. Such right was held to have been
waived by the defendant's failure to request such confrontation
in the trial.
C. Murder
In State v. Watts89 the defendant's husband was found fatally
wounded in his house. The evidence indicated that the defendant
shot the deceased after the two had had an altercation. The
murder weapon was found in an adjoining room along with one
spent cartridge. One issue raised on appeal was whether the
corpus delicti had been proved. The elements constituting the
corpus delicti are: (1) the death of the person whose life is
alleged to have been taken feloniously and (2) proof of the
criminal agency of another in taking the life of such person.90
The defendant conceded that the first element had been proved
but alleged that the second could not be proved by certain state-
ments or a confession of the accused.
The supreme court found that the fact that a pistol, a deadly
weapon, had been used to inflict the mortal wound was enough
to raise a presumption of malicious use of firearms and prove the
elements of the corpus delicti. The court, continuing its reason-
ing, next disposed of any objection to the use of the extra-judi-
cial statements, further proving the corpus delicti and the de-
fendant's guilt. The accused had said, "I shot Francis with his
own gun" shortly after arriving police officers had discovered
the decedent and the murder weapon. The court rejected an
argument based on Miranda91 that the statement was inadmissi-
ble, by pointing out that no arrest had been made, that this was
not a custodial interrogation, and that the Miranda rule was not
in force at the time of the trial. Furthermore, the statement was
not objected to when introduced at the trial.
89. 249 S.C. 80, 152 S.E2d 684 (1967).
90. State v. Epes, 209 S.C. 246, 39 S.E.2d 769 (1946).
91. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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D. Rape
Carnal knowledge, which is completed by even the slightest
penetration, is a material element in a prosecution for rape and
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.9 2 In State v.
Thonwas" one of the appellant's contentions was that since there
was no convincing proof of penetration, the verdict of guilty
was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The court held that
even without the pathologist's report, which could have been
objected to, other competent evidence supported the state's argu-
ment that penetration had been achieved, namely, the detailed
testimony of the prosecutrix' doctor coupled with her own testi-
mony that the defendant had "raped" her. As to this latter
point the court noted that there was no doubt that the prosecu-
trix knew the ordinary meaning of the word "rape." 94
E. Robbery
In Dukes v. State5 the supreme court tried to clarify any pre-
vious misconceptions with regard to the state's robbery statutes.
Robbery was defined as "larceny from the person or immediate
presence of another by violence or intimidation."96 The court
noted that at common law it was classified as a felony for which
no special punishment was provided by statute whether it was
committed on the highway or elsewhere. Hence, it fell under
Section 17-552 of the Code which provides a maximum of ten
years imprisonment for a felony for which no special punish-
ment is provided.9 7 Where one commits robbery while armed
with a pistol or other deadly weapon,98 however, a special pun-
ishment is provided in Section 16-333, namely, a maximum pen-
alty of twenty-five years at hard labor.99 According to the court,
armed robbery could be properly charged where it occurred on
a highway or elsewhere. Thus, armed robbery on the highway
was held to be subject to Section 16-333.
Cw~iam Anamn TAXwiO, I
92. See State v. Worthy, 239 S.C. 449, 123 S.E2d 835 (1962) ; State v.
Wyatt, 221 S.C. 407, 70 S.E.2d 635 (1952); State v. Miller, 211 S.C. 306, 45
S.E2d 23 (1947).
93. 248 S.C. 573, 151 S.E2d 855 (1966).
94. See State v. Moorer, 241 S.C. 487, 129 S.E.2d 330 (1963).
95. 248 S.C. 227, 149 S.E2d 598 (1966).
96. Id. at 231, 149 S.E2d at 599 (1966).
97. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-552 (1962).
98. "Deadly weapon" as used in the statute is defined in S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-145 (1962).
99. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-333 (1962).
[Vol. 19
17
Wynn: Criminal Law and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 1967
DAMAGES
The case of Hughey v. Ausbon 1 presented a close damages
issue to the Supreme Court of South Carolina. According to
the majority opinion the question had never before been decided
in South Carolina.
The wife and minor child of the respondent in this action had
been injured as a result of the negligence of the appellant and
each had recovered both actual and punitive damages for her
personal injuries in separate actions against the appellant. The
present action was brought by the respondent to recover dam-
ages for medical expenses incurred by his wife and minor child
and for the loss of consortium of his wife. The lower court
again awarded both actual and punitive damages.
On appeal the principal question was whether punitive dam-
ages should be allowed in a case in which the injury inflicted
on the plaintiff had at once and perhaps more directly been an
injury to his wife and child. The South Carolina Supreme
Court, by a four-to-one decision, reversed the lower court's deci-
sion on this issue.
2
At issue in this case is the ZegaZ independence of a cause of
action that is faotUa fy dependent on the existence of another
cause of action. The husband-father's injury is factually de-
pendent on the injury to his wife and child, both with respect
to recovery for medical expenses and with respect to recovery
for loss of consortium. The law, however, makes pointed efforts
to separate the elements of damages sustained by the parties, and
separate causes of action arise.
Can it be said, however, that the husband-father's cause of
action is so completely legally independent that if the negligence
which proximately caused his injury was committed recklessly
and willfully, he should be allowed to recover punitive damages?
The South Carolina Supreme Court, following most of the
scant authority on the question, answered in the negative. The
court held that the husband-father's right of recovery is strictly
compensatory.
A concurring opinion by Justice Brailsford provides a clue
to what was perhaps the basic reason behind the decision;
namely, the fear that a defendant may otherwise be "mulct
1. 154 S.E2d 839 (S.C. 1967).
2. Id.
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twice for the same loss."3 A defendant will be subject only once
to suit for the medical expenses of the wife, for example, or for
any of the other elements of compensatory damages. He may,
however, be punished unduly in the form of exemplary damages
if both indirectly injured plaintiffs and directly injured plain-
tiffs are allowed to recover such damages.4
ROBET L. Wy , I
3. 154 S.E.2d at 843.
4. The lone dissenting opinion, by Justice Bussey, is based primarily on the
premise that the question in this case has already been decided in South Caro-
lina. The cases cited by the dissent, however, are factually distinguished by
Justice Brailsford in his concurring opinion. It is Justice Brailsford's opinion,
and apparently the opinion of the other justices making up the majority, that
the cases raised are examples of truly origihal causes of action.
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